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DEGREES OF INTERMEDIATION
Patricia A. McCoy*
Normally, we think of intermediation as a binary thing: either
you have it or you do not. Disintermediation commands attention
because it is dramatic and rare in highly industrialized ecdnomies,
evoking images of bank runs and start-up funding through
crowdsourcing. Yet in our complex financial world, individual
investors rarely experience a clean, on-off choice between
intermediation and its absence. Instead, retail investors must
navigate a system presenting different degrees of intermediation,
depending on the vehicle and transaction. The degree of
intermediation has important welfare implications for investors.
Typically, we think of intermediation in simplistic terms as the
process of pooling individual investments and jointly investing those
funds in order to reap the benefits of expertise, diversification, and
scale. We know, however, that intermediaries come in many
different types. From the viewpoint of an investor, the benefits and
risks of a mediated investment will depend heavily on the degree of
intermediation.
We see this acutely in the area of retirement savings. In a
system with no intermediation, any retirement savings most likely
would be buried in the backyard or invested in tangible assets or
individual businesses. That is a far cry from the situation in the
United States today. The contemporary retirement landscape
features a remarkable variety of retirement savings vehicles,
offering different levels of intermediation.
Normally, we do not categorize financial intermediaries in
terms of the risks they pose to suppliers of capital. However,
different forms of intermediation present different constellations of
risks and these differences can directly affect the welfare of
investors, including those who are saving for retirement. In the
retirement context, the most sophisticated financial intermediaries
provide their customers or participants with protection against
longevity, market, and often inflation risk plus another type of risk I
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refer to as cumulation risk. These same intermediaries also afford
greater putative investment expertise to their customers. In
contrast, other types of retirement savings vehicles that are lower
down on the intermediation spectrum do not provide the same high
level of investment expertise or safeguards to savers.
In an ideal world, individuals would have unfettered access to
the full spectrum of financial intermediaries and could choose their
desired level of intermediation based on their needs and risk
preferences. In reality, there are severe discontinuities in the
supply of financial intermediaries offering the greatest protection
against risk for retirement savings. These days, relatively few
workers have access to defined benefit plans, and half of U.S.
workers lack access to any workplace pension plan at all.1 Fixed
annuities, however, offer many of the same benefits as defined
benefit plans without the same constrictions in supply. The Article
closes by raising some preliminary questions on what would be
needed to transform fixed annuities into a true substitute for the
vanishing defined benefit plan.
I. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
At their core, financial intermediaries are middlemen. Their
central function is to collect capital from savers and reinvest that
capital in ventures and other assets. Financial intermediaries can
be grouped into retail or primary intermediaries, who primarily
serve individual households and nonfinancial businesses, and
wholesale or secondary intermediaries-such as the Federal Reserve
Banks and reinsurers-who primarily serve financial institutions.2
The primary focus of this article will be on retail intermediaries
serving retirement savers such as commercial banks and thrifts,
insurance companies, securities brokers, mutual funds, and
employer-sponsored pension plans.3
1. Emily Brandon, Half of Workers Lack Retirement Benefits, U.S. NEWS:
MONEY (Aug. 30, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs
/planning-to-retire/2013/08/30/half-of-workers-lack-retirement-benefits
2. See, e.g., RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY SINCE 1900, at 50-51 (1958); Robert Charles Clark, The
Federal Income Taxation of Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1605-
06 (1975).
3. Private funds such as hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture
capital funds are also retail financial intermediaries. Under current federal
securities law, however, the average retirement saver does not meet the
qualifications to invest directly in these vehicles. See SEC Staff Investor
Bulletin No. 158 (Sept. 1, 2013) (the only individuals who can invest in private
funds are accredited investors with earned income of over $200,000 for the past
two years or a net worth of over $1 million). Accordingly, this article will not
address these types of intermediaries.
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The growth and enduring strength of financial intermediation is
one of the most remarkable hallmarks of advanced economies. What
accounts for this persistence? The typical financial intermediary
offers advantages that savers cannot achieve by investing alone.4
The first potential advantage is investment expertise-the vaunted
ability to discover profitable investment opportunities and
accurately price them. In a related vein, financial intermediaries
provide their customers with economies of scale because those
intermediaries can spread the cost of their research, legal support,
and asset monitoring over their customer base. These transaction
costs are usually too high for small retail investors to conduct those
activities profitably alone. In addition, financial intermediaries
often do not face the same information asymmetries about potential
investments as their retail customers due to access to proprietary
information. This is especially apparent with depository
institutions, which have unique knowledge about the financial
health of their borrowers to which most outsiders are not privy.5
Many financial intermediaries also offer risk-reduction benefits
in the form of diversification because of the size of their pooled
investments. That same diversification is often otherwise not
available to ordinary savers because they only have small sums to
invest. Finally, certain key financial intermediaries, most notably
depository institutions, offer maturity transformation by converting
demand deposits and other extremely short-term claims by savers
into longer-term assets, thereby providing savers with virtually the
same liquidity as cash while facilitating the accumulation of large
pools of capital for major long-term projects.6
The oldest forms of financial intermediaries, such as commercial
banks and insurance underwriters, sell investors claims against a
single pool. 7 Under this model, the intermediary retains sole control
over the choice of investments.
This traditional model, however, does not capture the full range
of institutional arrangements characterizing financial
intermediation today. As the explosive growth of mutual fund
families and variable annuity providers suggests, not all financial
intermediaries offer claims against one pool alone. In part for this
reason, it has become common in the vernacular to refer to financial
intermediaries more broadly as firms that collect funds from
4. For general discussion of these advantages, see Clark, supra note 2, at
1607-08; DAVID S. KIDWELL ET AL., FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND
MONEY 19-22 (11th ed. 2012).
5. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1996).
6. See KIDWELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 24.
7. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 695 (2000).
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multiple investors for investment. This definition is flexible enough
to encompass mutual funds, defined contribution plans, variable
annuity providers, investment banks, and broker/dealers.
In order to understand the risk calculus associated with
different levels of intermediation, we need to delve deeper and
analyze the varying claims and protections offered by various types
of financial intermediaries. The next section undertakes that
analysis.
II. DEGREES OF INTERMEDIATION
As the wide variety of financial intermediaries suggests, the
traditional, unitary conception of a financial intermediary begs the
question: what distinguishes financial intermediaries from one
another. Intermediaries occupy different market niches in response
to customer preferences. Some offer equity claims; others offer debt.
Some of those claims are long-term in nature; other claims are
redeemable on demand. Some offer claims against a single pool of
investments; others offer claims against a choice of multiple pools.
Some so-called financial intermediaries serve as middlemen but
don't pool investments at all.
It is interesting to explore this question through the lens of
retirement savings. One reason has to do with the sector's sheer
size. In the fourth quarter of 2014, household retirement assets in
the United States (including employer-sponsored defined benefit
and defined contribution plans, individual retirement accounts
("IRAs"), and annuities) totaled $27.491 trillion.8 Similarly, people
have a virtually universal need for retirement security9 that cuts
across every segment of society. Finally, U.S. residents almost
always have to interact with financial intermediaries to assure
adequate private sources of savings for retirement because Social
8. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FINANCIAL ACCouNTs OF
THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED
MACROECONOMIC AccOuNTS FIRST QUARTER 2015, 93 tbl.L.117 (2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/current/zl.pdf. This sum was
approximately one-and-a-half times the gross domestic product that quarter.
See id. at 12 tbl.F.6 (author's computations).
9. The death rate in the United States remains low through age fifty-four
(apart from infants under the age of one) and does not begin to increase rapidly
until the age cohort of sixty-five to seventy-four years when most U.S. residents
have retired. See, e.g., U.S. Death Rates by Age Group, DATA3601
http://www.data360.org/dsg.aspx?DataSetGroupId=587 (last visited Aug. 31,
2015); Alicia H. Munnell, What Is the Average Retirement Age?, Soc'Y
ACTUARIES, https://www.soa.org/News-and-Publications/Newsletters/Pension-
Section-News/2012/february/What-Is-The-Average-Retirement-Age-.aspx (last
visited Aug. 31, 2015).
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Security is not designed to serve as the exclusive source of
retirement income.10
In the retirement savings space, financial intermediaries vary
along a number of dimensions representing different degrees of
intermediation. The first dimension, naturally, is mediation.
Financial intermediaries mediate investments by serving as
middlemen who accept funds from the public for purposes of
investment. This trait is common to all financial intermediaries,
and it is only when there is no intermediary-as with cash stored at
home, direct investment in individual issuers, or tangible property-
that we have full disintermediation.
The second degree of intermediation involves the pooling of
investments. In the retirement area, most financial intermediaries
invest funds received from customers into pooled vehicles of one type
or another. By pooling, I mean investment in a portfolio of assets as
opposed to purchase of a single asset. Defined benefit plans,
annuity providers, banks, defined contribution plans, most IRAs,
and mutual funds all offer pooled investments.11 The only
investment avenues that do not offer pooling are cash and
investments in individual issuers or assets such as individual
commodities or real estate (whether those investments are
mediated).
Intermediaries who pool investments are not alike, however. In
the third degree of intermediation, intermediaries differ according to
the nature of the contractual claims they provide. Some pooled
intermediaries-notably defined benefit plans, fixed annuity
providers, and banks-offer only one pool of investments, consisting
of the assets in the intermediary's general account. For instance, a
depositor invests in a pool consisting of the assets of a bank, while a
fixed annuity buyer invests in a pool made up of the assets in an
insurer's general account. When a financial intermediary offers a
single pool to retirement savers, normally those customers receive
claims in the form of debt or other fixed claims 12 in return.1 3 In
10. See Prepare For Your Financial Needs, Soc. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/r&m6.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (stating that
the "three major elements of your retirement portfolio are" pension benefits,
savings and investments, and Social Security benefits).
11. It is not surprising that so many retirement vehicles involve pooling.
Pooling offers diversification and expertise to ordinary investors who would
often be hard-pressed to achieve those benefits on their own.
12. Liabilities in the form of defined benefit pension claims and fixed
annuity claims are technically not accounted for as debt. They resemble debt,
however, in that customers are only entitled to fixed periodic payments for a
stated period and do not have a right to share in any additional gains of the
investment portfolio. See, e.g., Funding Challenge: Keeping Defined Benefit
Pension Plans Afloat, Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 1-2
(2003) (statement of Sen. Baucus, U.S. Sen.); Liabilities-Accounting for Long-
2015] 555
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
contrast, defined contribution plans offered through the workplace,
standard IRAs, and mutual funds and variable annuities offered
outside of both of those retirement vehicles offer savers a choice of
investment pools. Individuals who invest in those plans or funds
only receive equity claims, not debt or other fixed claims.
These debt and equity claims offer different tradeoffs in risks
and rewards.14 Debt and debt-like claims provide a contractual
promise of a fixed periodic return over the life of the investment.15
In addition, debt claims take priority over equity if the issuer goes
insolvent.' 6 The upside potential of debt instruments is capped
contractually, however. In contrast, equity claims offer unlimited
potential appreciation, but can lose principal and stand last in line
in the event of insolvency.' 7
The last degree of intermediation is tailored to the retirement
context and features the use of actuarial methods. Defined benefit
plans and fixed annuity providers distinguish themselves from other
financial intermediaries and full disintermediation by offering a
contractual promise to make fixed periodic payments until death
(similar to Social Security).15 These providers underwrite this
commitment through actuarial analysis based on the statistical risk
of mortality in the populations they insure.' 9
Term Liabilities, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/exam-guide/cfa-
level- 1/liabilities/long-term-liabilities-accounting.asp (last visited Aug. 31,
2015). While the Social Security Administration and Trust Fund, as
government entities, are not financial intermediaries in the commercial sense,
they resemble private providers who offer fixed claims against a single pool by
collecting payroll deductions, investing them, and paying out defined retirement
benefits.
13. Of course, investors can also buy stock in depository institutions and
fixed annuity providers. The point is, however, that those providers offer
retirement savers a choice of debt or debt-like claims. Most other investment
vehicles further down the intermediation spectrum do not afford that choice.
14. See KIDWELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 16.
15. Traditional debt claims, such as depository accounts and bonds, offer a
stated interest rate plus full return of principal. Defined benefit plans and
fixed annuities offer a fixed monthly benefit (sometimes with inflation
protection).
16. See Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on
Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1159, 1176-77 (1994).
17. Id. at 1177.
18. Some fixed annuities only pay out for a set number of years, instead of
through the beneficiary's death (the other two vehicles do not) However,
investors who want a payout until death can find fixed annuities that provide
that protection. Explaining Types of Fixed Annuities, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.comlarticles/retirement/05/071205.asp (last visited
Aug. 31, 2015).
19. See, e.g., David F. Kays, Impact of Mortality Table Projection Scales on
Defined Benefit Pension Plan Valuations, Soc'Y ACTUARIES, https://www.soa.org
/research/research-projects/pension/research-impact-of-mortality-projection-
556 [Vol. 50
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Taking these dimensions, we can array retirement investment
vehicles along a spectrum, with the highest degree of intermediation
on the left end and full disintermediation on the right.
FIGURE 1
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At the far left of the spectrum are defined benefit plans and
fixed annuity providers, which offer the highest degree of
intermediation by providing debt claims against one pool based on
actuarial modeling. To their immediate right are banks, which also
offer debt claims against a single pool but do not use actuarial
methods to compute those claims. In the middle of the spectrum are
defined contribution plans, IRAs, mutual funds, and variable
annuities, which offer equity claims to savers and a choice among
multiple portfolios and pools. (As Subpart III.B will discuss, defined
contribution plans fall to the immediate left of IRAs, mutual funds,
and variable annuities because those plans offer a double layer of
expertise that the other two vehicles do not). Moving to the right,
brokers and dealers who offer investments in single issuers provide
mediation without the benefit or expertise of pooling.20 Finally,
disintermediation offers retirement savers neither pooling nor
actuarial modeling, but it does reduce or eliminate principal-agent
problems from relying on intermediaries. These different degrees of
scales-on-defined-benefit-pension-plan-valuations.aspx (last visited Aug. 31,
2015).
20. These claims can consist of equity or debt, depending on the type of
investment.
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intermediation have strong welfare implications for retirement
savers.
III. THE IMPLICIT WELFARE TRADEOFFS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES OF
INTERMEDIATION
In the retirement context, the welfare implications of given
degrees of intermediation depend most importantly on the risks to
retirement savers. These risks play out against a backdrop of other
important considerations, including the availability of investment
expertise, the effective use of that expertise, and the investor's range
of choice.
A. The Shifting Risk Calculus of Degrees of Intermediation
No retirement savings vehicle is risk-free and each presents
tradeoffs. However, the nature and magnitude of those risks vary
significantly, depending on the degree of intermediation being
offered. As a general rule, the higher the degree, the greater the
protection to retirement savers. In other words, the type of claims
that a financial intermediary offers directly shapes the risk-return
calculus for its customers.
Savers face five main risks when investing for retirement:
(1) longevity risk, (2) cumulation risk, (3) market risk, (4) inflation
risk, and (5) solvency risk. Whether the tradeoffs among these risks
are optimal for any given vehicle will depend, in part, on an
individual's life situation, preferences, and ability to absorb loss. It
will also depend, as we will see, on whether that vehicle is available
to that individual for investment.
1. Longevity Risk
Typically, a defined benefit pension pays beneficiaries a fixed
monthly annuity from the retirement date until death. Social
Security and private fixed annuities also offer this contractual
feature. Retirement savers with any of these vehicles can count on
receiving those income streams until they die. 21 Precisely for this
reason, defined benefit pensions are often regarded as the gold
standard of private retirement plans. 22
21. Defined benefit pension checks, Social Security payments, and fixed
annuity payments also protect retirees from the risk that a criminal will
abscond with their full retirement savings because anyone intent on doing so
cannot steal the underlying corpus but can only steal one payment at a time.
Lawrence A. Frolik, Rethinking ERISA's Promise of Income Security in a World
of 401(k) Plans, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 396, 401 (2014).
22. That said, defined benefit plans can limit employee mobility due to
their vesting requirements and lack of portability. In addition, employers who




Only retirement savings vehicles with the, highest degree of
intermediation offer this type of contractual protection to retirement
savers. In contrast, retirees who depend on other retirement
savings vehicles lower down on the intermediation spectrum run the
risk of outliving their assets, a risk known as longevity risk.
During the spend-down (or decumulation) phase of retirement,
savers face the challenge of drawing down their savings slowly
enough that they do not outlive their assets. Unless a retiree has a
contractual or statutory right to annuitized payments that defined
benefit plans and fixed annuities offer, the chance of depleting one's
assets before death is substantial. 23 Retirees who must depend on
lump sum savings face numerous uncertainties in attempting to
gauge how far their money will stretch. The unknowns include how
long those individuals will live, how high their future living
expenses will rise, whether they will remain able to manage their
money successfully from a cognitive and physical perspective, how
markets will perform, and whether they will cash out their entire
lump sum investments. 24
Defined benefit plans and fixed annuity providers solve these
challenges by using actuarial modeling to project the income that
would be needed to make fixed periodic payments until death. In the
process, the sponsors of defined benefit plans and fixed annuity
issuers are both able to assume longevity risk, which their
customers would otherwise have to bear.25
For retirement savers who do not participate in defined benefit
plans or buy fixed annuities, the decumulation phase is fraught with
peril because the longevity risk remains on them. The savings or
cumulation phase is often problematic as well, as the next section
discusses. If either phase goes wrong, chances are that the affected
retirees will end up in poverty, relegating them to a miserable
existence and generating a need for public assistance. 26
23. See, e.g., Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Disappearing Defined Benefit
Pension and Its Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby Boomers,
Soc. SEC. BULL., at 1, Oct. 2009, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v69n3
/v69n3pl.pdf.
24. See Frolik, supra note 21, at 382-87.
25. Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 755, 764 (2015) ("Employer contributions are based on actuarial
valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and
responsibilities.").
26. A sense of that need can be gleaned from findings showing that nearly
thirty percent of people in households age fifty to sixty-four who died between
2010 and 2012 left no assets behind. Sudipta Banerjee, A Look at the End-of-
Life Financial Situation in America, EBRI.ORG at 1, 9, Apr. 2015,
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdflEBRI Notes_04_Aprl 5_EoL-PolFor.pdf.
Among individuals who died during that period age eighty-five or above, 12.2%
had exhausted their assets at death. Id. at 1.
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2. Cumulation Risk
Just as retirees face challenges in how to tap their retirement
nest eggs, people also have trouble amassing enough savings in the
first place for a financially secure retirement.27 This is a particular
problem for workers outside of defined benefit plans. We can see
this from 2013 data, when the median retirement account balance
was only $2500 for all working-age households and only $14,500 for
households nearing retirement.28 These low levels suggest that
ordinary households have enormous difficulty saving enough for
retirement on their own. I refer to the risk of retiring with
insufficient savings as cumulation risk.
Here too, the level of intermediation matters, although not in
the same linear manner as longevity risk. One of the less
appreciated aspects of defined benefit plans is that they are
actuarially designed to replace earned income at a fairly high rate
(assuming, that is, that the worker participates in the plan over the
maximum number of years). 29 To ensure this replacement rate,
defined benefit plans mandate a high rate of contributions. 30 Some
defined contribution plans-namely, 401(a) plans in which the
27. See generally Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based
Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2581329 (explaining the failures of employment-
based approaches to retirement savings and suggesting possible solutions).
28. Nari Rhee & Ilana Boivie, The Continuing Retirement Savings Crisis,
NAT'L INST. ON RETIREMENT SEC. (Mar. 2015), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edulpdf
/2015/RetirementSavingsCrisis.pdf. In 2015, the Employee Benefit Research
Institute estimated the aggregate national retirement savings deficit at $4.13
trillion for U.S. households with heads of household between the ages of twenty-
five and sixty-four. EBRI: Current U.S. Retirement Savings Deficit Is $4.13
Trillion, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.ebri.org/pdf
/PR1115.SenAging.PR.12Marl5.pdf.
29. Maher, supra note 27. One report concluded that employees who stay
in the same defined benefit pension plan for more than thirty years receive
benefits equal to a replacement rate of sixty percent for their last five years of
wages. See James H. Moore, Jr., Measuring Defined Benefit Plan Replacement
Rates with PenSync, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2004, at 57, http://www.bls.gov
/opub/mlr/2004/11/art6full.pdf. Because Social Security replaces forty percent
of the average worker's wage, employees in this situation may be able to replace
one-hundred percent of their wages at retirement. See Prepare For Your
Financial Needs, supra note 10. In contrast, workers who participated in a
given defined benefit plan for less than ten years only had a 9% replacement
rate on average. See Moore, supra. Because employer-based defined benefit
plans are not portable, a worker's ability to realize this high replacement rate
depends on whether she remains in the defined benefit plan for most or all of
her career. There are several reasons why this may not occur. The employee
may be terminated or voluntarily quit her job to accept a job with another
employer. Alternatively, the employer may terminate its defined benefit plan
earlier in the worker's career or file for bankruptcy.
30. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 29.
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employer contractually mandates the level of employee
contributions and employer match-can also produce high
replacement rates, depending on the contribution rate and a given
employee's tenure. 31 Both types of plans also reinforce the goal of
mandatory-targeted savings rates by prohibiting or severely
restricting participants' ability to withdraw contributions from the
plan before retirement for other purposes.3 2
These defined benefit plans and 401(a) plans that mitigate
cumulation risk both fall on the left side of the intermediation
spectrum. Other savings vehicles located on the same half of the
spectrum-namely, fixed annuities and bank deposit accounts-do
not expressly aim to produce a high replacement rate. Similarly,
none of the investment vehicles on the right side of the
intermediation spectrum-including 401(k) defined contribution
plans that lack a mandatory contribution feature-defrays
cumulation risk for retirement savers. 33 The onus of cumulation
31. Some 401(k) plans are 401(a) plans, but not all are. Normally, the law
does not require employers to assume cumulation risk in their 401(k) plans.
Undertaking that risk is costly for employers, due to added plan administration
expenses and also the cost of any employer match. To avoid those costs, many
employers who offer 401(k) plans only offer voluntary plans, often with no
employer match. Those plans put the onus of contributing enough (and
contributing at all) on the worker. Meanwhile, 401(a) plans can be designed to
reduce cumulation risk, but they do not do so as consistently as defined benefit
plans. The mandatory contribution rates of 401(a) plans are not always high
and other defined contribution plans make contributions purely voluntary. In
the vast majority of defined contribution plans, ensuring a high replacement
rate is rarely of concern to employers. See Majority of U.S. Companies Do Not
Measure Effectiveness of Retirement Plans for Employees, Wells Fargo Survey
Reveals, WELLS FARGO (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/press
/2012/20120419_MajorityofUSCompanies/. Unlike defined benefit plans,
moreover, 401(a) plans with mandatory contributions do not contractually
promise high replacement rates and do not use actuarial modeling. For 401(a)
plans that do mandate high contribution rates, those plans rely solely on high
contribution levels to boost the chance of adequate retirement income.
Consequently, the risk that a high replacement rate will not materialize due to
other factors such as market downturns falls on the employee.
32. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(2)(B) (2012) (limiting the distribution of
assets in tax-preferred defined contribution plans); What You Should Know
About Your Retirement Plan, U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa
/publications/wyskapr.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) ("If an employee leaves
after vesting in a benefit but before the plan's retirement age, the benefit
generally stays with the plan until the employee files a claim for it at
retirement.").
33. In fact, some defined contribution plans magnify cumulation risk by
allowing participants to take out loans or withdrawals before retirement for a
variety of other purposes. See AON HEWITT, LEAKAGE OF PARTICIPANTS' DC
ASSETS: How LOANS, WITHDRAWALS, AND CASHOUTs ARE ERODING RETIREMENT
INCOME 5 (2011), http://www.aon.com/attachments/thoughtleadership/survey
_asset leakage.pdf.
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
risk falls on individual households in all of these other retirement
vehicles, including elective 401(k)s, IRAs, individual annuities,
ordinary mutual funds, and individual securities. Consequently, as
the level of intermediation drops, the cumulation risk grows.
3. Market Risk
Another distinguishing mark of intermediaries involves
whether they expose investors to market risk, which is the risk of
loss of principal resulting from movements in market prices. At the
far left end of the intermediation spectrum, three types of financial
intermediaries-defined benefit plans, fixed annuity providers, and
commercial banks-offer debt or debt-like claims to investors that
are backed by a single pool of assets.34 Due to this structure, all
three categories of intermediaries shoulder the market risk
presented by the pool, which relieves the investors from having to
assume that risk themselves. Further to the right on the
intermediation spectrum, savers usually only receive equity claims,
not fixed claims, and therefore must bear the market risk
themselves.35
Defined benefit plans, fixed annuities, and bank deposits offer a
double shield against market risk because the intermediary bears
that risk contractually while also being backstopped by social
insurance. The government partially guarantees the performance of
debt claims made by these issuers, in the form of Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") guarantees for defined benefit plan
participants, federal deposit insurance for bank depositors, and
state guaranty fund protection for fixed annuity customers. 36 There
are no comparable government guarantees for other types of
retirement savings, which all allocate market risk to workers. In
the event of an inevitable market downturn, participants in defined
contribution plans have no social insurance to fall back on and
neither do participants in IRAs, variable annuities, 37 or plain vanilla
34. The only other type of pooled intermediary to offer debt-like claims
consists of retail money market mutual funds, which are found in the middle of
the spectrum. Although claims on retail money market mutual funds are
technically equity, not debt, they resemble debt in that the shares are
redeemable at par and the share price is set at a fixed $1 per share. See Money
Market Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers
/mfmmkt.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2013). Except under conditions of extreme
inflation, however, money market mutual funds are not ideal retirement
savings vehicles because their expected returns are too low to keep abreast of
inflation.
35. Cash (at the far right end of the spectrum) is an exception. Similarly,
individual bonds do not present market risk unless they are held to maturity.
36. See infra, notes 46-48.
37. The only exception for variable annuities consists of minimum
guaranteed benefits, which some state guaranty funds will indemnify up to
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mutual funds.38 Investors in these vehicles offering lesser degrees of
intermediation do not have the double shield against market risk
that the highest degrees of intermediation afford.
4. Inflation Risk
Given the length of the average retirement, 39 retirees must also
worry whether the returns on their portfolios will keep up with
inflation. Defined benefit plans typically help defray inflation in two
ways: by seeking to manage the risk-adjusted returns on the
portfolio to stay ahead of inflation and sometimes by providing
contractual promises for annual cost-of-living adjustments (similar
to Social Security). 40 Fixed annuities can also provide inflation
riders (although generally at a stiff price). 4 1 In both cases, this
inflation protection is the fruit of the actuarial and financial
modeling that defined benefit plans and annuity issuers provide.
stated limits. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, CONN. LIFE & HEALTH INS.
GuAR. Ass'N, http://www.ctlifega.org/faq.cfm (last visited Aug. 31, 2015)
(describing what the Connecticut Life and Health Insurance Guaranty
Association protects).
38. In 2008, the federal government granted unprecedented temporary
coverage of many money market mutual fund balances in order to stem a run on
money market funds and an ensuing collapse of the commercial-paper markets.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hpll47.aspx. Those guarantees expired in
September 2009. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Next Phase of Government
Financial Stabilization and Rehabilitation Policies (Sept. 2009), WALL STREET
J., http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/treasury09l3O9.pdf.
39. At the time of this writing, the average length of retirement in the
United States was eighteen years. See Retirement Statistics, STAT. BRAIN RES.
INST., http://www.statisticbrain.com/retirement-statistics/ (last visited Aug. 31,
2015).
40. Many government defined benefit pension plans offer cost-of-living
adjustments, while most private defined benefit pension plans do not. See Can
Your Pension Plan Afford to Give COLAs?, PENSION RIGHTS CTR.,
http://www.pensionrights.org/publications/fact-sheet/can-your-pension-plan-
afford-give-colas (last visited July 26, 2015). Since the 2008 financial crisis,
however, at least seventeen states have reduced or eliminated those
adjustments for public employee pensions. Alicia H. Munnell et al., COLA Cuts
in State/Local Pensions, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT REs. B.C., May 2014, at 1, 2,
http://crr.bc.edulwp-content/uploads/2014/05/slp_38_508rev.pdf.
41. See, e.g., Should You Get an Inflation-Adjusted Annuity?, USA TODAY
(Oct. 21, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist
/waggoner/2012/10/18/waggoner-inflation-adjusted-annuity/1639119/ ("An
inflation-adjusted annuity aims to solve the problem [of inflation] by giving you
an automatic cost-of-living increase every year. But the cost is steep. A
$100,000 inflation-adjusted annuity policy from Principal Life Insurance offers
a $379 monthly payout for a 65-year-old man; American General offers a $363
monthly check. At 3% inflation, you'd have to wait 15 years before you'd equal
the payout from an immediate annuity without inflation protection.").
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With limited exceptions, all other investment options shift
inflation risk to the saver. Retail investors in these other options
must weigh the risk of overly conservative returns on bonds and
other debt instruments against the risk of higher volatility equity
returns. In contrast, as discussed, some defined benefit plans and
fixed annuity issuers provide inflation riders. While this protection
is not universal, to the extent it can be had, it is on the left end of
the intermediation spectrum.
5. Solvency Risk
So far, I have argued that defined benefit plans and fixed
annuity providers afford unique risk protections that retirement
savers cannot obtain through other forms of investment. At the
same time, however, those providers (like depository institutions)
pose solvency risk to their beneficiaries and customers, which other
pooled investments to the right on the intermediation spectrum do
not pose, at least not to the same degree.
The solvency risk from defined benefit plans, insurance
companies, and banks emanates from the fact that the
creditworthiness of their customers' claims depends directly on the
provider's own solvency. 42  Of course, one component of that
solvency risk is the same risk that one or more of a pooled
intermediary's investments will default or go insolvent.43 But
unlike mutual funds and defined contribution plans, insurance
companies, defined benefit plan sponsors, and banks can go
insolvent for reasons other than the poor performance of their
individual investments. Insurance companies and defined benefit
plan sponsors may collect too few premiums or contributions, or
misgauge the actuarial assumptions used to meet their payout
obligations. Banks may underestimate their liquidity needs and
find themselves vulnerable to runs.44 Mismanagement of other lines
of the company's business can also topple an insurance underwriter,
a plan sponsor, or a bank.
The government seeks to defray this solvency risk through
regulation and social insurance. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), state insurance law, and state and
42. In the case of defined benefit plans, that provider is the plan sponsor
itself.
43. In addition, all financial intermediaries face solvency risk due to theft.
There are strict legal safeguards to reduce that risk.
44. Money market mutual funds also experienced runs during the financial
crisis in 2008. Diana B. Henriques, Money Market Fund Says Customers Could
Lose Money, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17
/business/17fund.html?_r=0; Lawrence Schmidt et al., Runs on Money Market




federal banking regulations heavily oversee the solvency of defined
benefit plans, fixed annuity providers, and depository institutions
respectively.45 If the worst occurs and one of these private-sector
intermediaries fails, beneficiaries, annuitants, and/or depositors can
look to social insurance to recoup all or part of their claims. The
PBGC guarantees payment of basic pension benefits, up to specified
dollar limits, for participants in private sector defined benefit
plans.46 State guaranty funds guarantee fixed annuity claims by
insurance companies, again up to stated limits. 4 7 Finally, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insures bank and thrift
deposits in the event of closure.48
This safety net has holes, however. With respect to private-
sector pensions, the PBGC is running a large deficit and is not
explicitly backed by the full faith and credit of the federal
government. 49 Furthermore, plan funding remains a challenge. As
of 2011, the private-sector plans that the PBGC insured were only
funded 85% in the aggregate.50
A bigger problem involves the PBGC's limited coverage. The
PBGC does not insure church or public-sector pensions,5 1 where
defined benefit pensions are far more prevalent. 52 Meanwhile, in
45. See GARY A. HERNANDEZ & PAIGE D. WATERS, 2-14 NEW APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION ch. 14 (2015) (discussing solvency regulation of
insurance companies); PATRICIA A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 6.03
(Lexis 2014 Supp.) (discussing capital adequacy standards for insured
depository institutions); JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 3-5 (2004) (discussing minimum
funding standards for private sector defined benefit plans).
46. Facts from EBRI: Basics of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1 (Nov. 2013), http://ebri.org/pdf/publications
/facts/1113fact.pdf. In 2014, the maximum guaranteed benefit for participants
in PBGC-protected, single-employer plans was $4,943.18 a month. Data Book
Listing, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. tbl.S-53, http://pbgc.gov/documents
/2012-Data-Book-Tables.pdf (last visited July 26, 2015).
47. See Policyholder Information: The Safety Net at Work, NAT'L ORG. LIFE
& HEALTH INS. GUARANTY Ass'NS, http://nolhga.org/policyholderinfo/main.cfm
/location/systemworks (last visited July 26, 2015).
48. See Understanding Deposit Insurance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/ (last updated June 3, 2014).
49. See Facts from EBRI: Basics of the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC), supra note 46, at 1. At year-end 2013, the PBGC had a
deficit of $27.4 billion for single-employer plans and $8.3 billion for multi-
employer plans. See FY 2015: Congressional Budget Justification, PENSION
BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP. 18 (2014), http://pbgc.gov/Documents/Budget-CBJ-
2015.pdf.
50. See Data Book Listing, supra note 46, tbl.S-44.
51. Facts from EBRI Basics of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), supra note 46, at 1.
52. This disparity is striking. Eighty-seven percent of state and local
government employees participated in defined benefit plans in 2009, whereas
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recent years, state and local governments have struggled with
massive funding shortfalls in their defined benefit plans, with no
real solution in sight.53
State guaranty coverage for fixed annuities also has its
limitations. Most state guaranty funds are not pre-funded, with
New York's being the only exception. 54 In addition, the most that a
state guaranty fund will guarantee for a given individual's annuities
per issuer ranges from $100,000 to $500,000, depending on the
state.55
Unlike most state insurance guaranty funds, federal deposit
insurance is pre-funded56 and thus on firmer financial footing. But
it too has limits and only provides coverage of up to $250,000 per
depositor per bank.5 7
Fortunately, while solvency risk exists, its incidence is
relatively low. Defaults by private-sector defined benefit plans are
rare, as witnessed by the fact that almost 60% of PBGC claims in
dollar terms between 1975 and 2012 were attributable to claims by
just ten firms.58 Similarly, a low number of insured participants in
private-sector defined benefit plans receive PBGC payouts in any
given year, equaling only 2.4% in 2012.59 To the extent a private-
sector defined benefit plan does default, most insured participants
in single-employer plans receive full pension coverage. Very few of
only 7% of private-sector employees did that year. EMP. BENEFIT RET. INST.,
EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS ch. 1 at 4, ch. 4 at tbl.4.ld (Mar. 2011),
http://www.ebri.org/publications/books/?fa=databook.
53. See, e.g., The Fiscal Health of State Pension Plans: Funding Gap
Continues to Grow, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2014/04/08/the-
fiscal-health-of-state-pension-plans-funding-gap-continues-to-grow. At least
one state supreme court has ruled that current participants in the state defined
benefit pension plan are constitutionally protected from reductions in benefits,
regardless of funding shortfalls. See In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1
(Ill. 2015).
54. See Phil Zinkewicz, State Guaranty Funds ... What Will Their Future
Role Be?, ROUGH NOTES COMPANY, INC. (Feb. 2009), http://www.roughnotes.com
/rnmagazine/2009/februaryO9/02p 102.htm.
55. See State Guarantee Funds: Life & Health Guaranty Associations,
ANNUITY ADVANTAGE, http://www.annuityadvantage.com/stateguarantee.htm
(last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
56. See The Deposit Insurance Fund, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/index.html (last updated June 24, 2015).
57. See Understanding Deposit Insurance, supra note 48.
58. Those ten firms were Pan American Air (1991-92), Trans World
Airlines (2001), LTV Steel (2002-04), Bethlehem Steel (2003), National Steel
(2003), US Airways (2003 and 2005), Weirton Steel (2004), United Airlines
(2005), Delta Air Lines (2006), and Delphi (2009). See Data Book Listing, supra
note 46, tbls.S-4, S-5.
59. See id. tbls. S-20, S-30 (author's calculations).
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those workers and retirees would have otherwise qualified for
pensions exceeding the maximum PBGC benefit limits. 60
State and municipal defined benefit plans pose greater solvency
risk, but so far the default rate has been low.6 1 The most publicized
cases in recent years have been Detroit, Michigan, and Stockton,
California, which both filed for bankruptcy in part due to their
pension commitments. 62  Both cities managed to emerge from
bankruptcy without abandoning their pension obligations to their
employees.63 The bigger question is what will happen a decade or so
from now, now that the baby boomer generation is entering
retirement and numerous state and local defined benefit plans are
seriously underfunded. 64
60. See id. tbls.S-26, S-53 (stating that in 2012, in single-employer
programs, only 2 percent of total PBGC payees claimed monthly benefits of
$2500 or more; the monthly maximum payment that year was $4653.41).
Things are more precarious for employees and retirees in private-sector
multiemployer defined benefit plans, where the maximum guaranteed amount
is $12,870 per year for employees with 30 years of service. Multiemployer
Insurance Program Facts, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP.,
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/factsheets/page/multi-facts.html (last visited Aug.
31, 2015). In contrast, for single-employer plans in 2015, the maximum
guaranteed amount was slightly over $60,000 per year for benefits starting at
age 65. Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTEE
CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-
guarantee.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (author's calculations).
61. PEW CTR. STATES, THE WIDENING GAP UPDATE 1 (2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs assets/2012/PewPen
sionsUpdatepdf.pdf ("States continue to lose ground in their efforts to cover the
long-term costs of their employees' pensions and retiree health care ....
[C]ontinued fiscal discipline and additional reforms will be needed to put states
back on a firm footing.").
62. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 194, 204 (E.D. Mich. 2013);
see also In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 14 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
63. See Claire Groden, Detroit and Stockton Are Just the Beginning of an
Attack on Public Pensions, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120630/stockton-detroit-bankruptcies-gut-
budgets-and-imperil-pensions. Stockton honored its pension payment
obligations to Calpers. Id. Detroit ended up negotiating reductions to retirees'
monthly pension checks while agreeing to continue those checks for the rest of
the retirees' lives. Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Emerges from Bankruptcy, Yet
Pension Risks Linger, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 11, 2014, 4:27 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/detroit-emerges-from-bankruptcy-
pension-risk-still-intact/? r=0.
64. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS To ADDRESS
COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY (2012), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-322; A
Widening Gap in Cities: Shortfalls in Funding for Pensions and Retiree Health
Care, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media
/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs assets/2013/Pewcitypensionsreportpdf.pdf; Moody's:
US Municipal Pension Risks Higher Than 10 Years Ago Despite Recent Strong
Asset Returns, MOODY'S (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.moodys.com/research
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Fixed annuitants and depositors also have limited solvency risk.
The national association of state guaranty funds for annuities has
stated that notwithstanding the states' coverage limits, "in recent
insolvencies more than ... 88% of policyholder annuity benefits
have been covered in full."65  Annuitants can further protect
themselves by only buying annuities from top-rated insurers and by
spreading their annuities purchases among different issuers and
owner designations to keep their total annuities exposure to any one
issuer within the state coverage limits. 66 Meanwhile, with respect
to bank accounts, no insured depositor has ever lost a cent of
insured deposits.67 Nor are the deposit insurance caps a serious
hindrance because depositors can obtain potentially limitless deposit
insurance coverage by spreading their deposits in increments of up
to $250,000 among different banks.
To summarize, we can see the overall distribution of risk
according to the type of financial intermediary in Figure 2.
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("[T]he downsize risk to funding has heightened because of the increased asset
allocation to equities and alternatives, and the large scale of assets necessary to
fund the liabilities for demographically aging pensions."); The Fiscal Health of
State Pension Plans: Funding Gap Continues to Grow, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(Mar. 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2014/03/31
IPewStatesWideningGapFactsheet2.pdf.
65. Policyholder Information: The Safety Net at Work, supra note 47.
66. See, e.g., Danny Fisher, How to Maximize Safety in Fixed Annuities,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH 29 (Oct. 4, 2004),
http://www.mrannuity.com/Articles/MaximizeSafety.pdf.
67. See Understanding Deposit Insurance, supra note 48.
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Solvency risk is the only major risk that financial
intermediaries to the far left of the spectrum pose to retirement
savers. To date, that risk has been minimal, although questions
linger about the future performance of underfunded government
defined benefit plans. In all other respects, financial intermediaries
at the left end of the spectrum provide the fullest safeguards to
workers and retirees from risk.
B. Investment Expertise
All financial intermediaries to the left of securities brokers on
the intermediation spectrum offer benefits from pooling to their
customers. These benefits include diversification and some form of
investment expertise. In contrast, savers who invest through
brokers or in disintermediated investments do not enjoy
diversification or professional asset management unless they
separately contract for it. The benefits from investment expertise to
savers increase as one moves left along the spectrum.
Diversification is a principal benefit of pooled investments.
Because diversification is so important to reducing risk to investors
in a pool, state and federal law mandate diversification through
rules that shape the portfolios of pooled intermediaries. Mutual
funds, for instance, are subject to mandatory diversification
requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940.68 These
1940 Act requirements also extend to mutual funds in IRAs and
workplace defined contribution plans.69  Meanwhile, banks,
insurance companies, and defined benefit plans operate under
stringent rules governing diversification of their assets.70 For the
most part, these diversification rules work well and usually are not
the subject of concern.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1) (2012).
69. See E*TRADE Securities, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 805 (Dec. 1, 2005) (applying the Investment Company Act to
individual retirement accounts); David Pratt, To (b) or Not to (b): Is That the
Question? Twenty-First Century Schizoid Plans Under Section 403(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 73 ALBANY L. REV. 139, 173 (2009).
70. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1054(j), 1104(a)(1)(C) (federal provisions imposing
a fiduciary duty to diversify the investments in an ERISA-regulated workplace
pension plan); HERNANDEZ & WATERS, supra note 45, § 14.03[3] (describing
diversification requirements for insurance underwriters); McCOY, supra note
45, § 6.05[1] (describing lending limit and other diversification requirements for
insured depository institutions). State and local defined benefit pension plan
trustees are similarly subject to a fiduciary duty to diversify the assets in their
plans. See, e.g., GFOA Best Practice: Public Employee Retirement System





Investment advice is a second potential benefit of most
investments that are mediated. At the right end of the
intermediation spectrum, disintermediation offers no investment
advice at all. The same is true for discount securities brokers. Full-
service securities brokers do offer investment advice and all pooled
intermediaries to the left of full-service brokers employ investment
advice for purposes of asset management.
Unlike diversification, this investment advice feature of pooled
intermediaries is more problematic. Professional asset management
and investment advice, like other aspects of financial
intermediation, are susceptible to conflicts of interest (usually based
on compensation incentives) that can result in principal-agent
problems. Accordingly, whether professional asset management or
investment advice serves an investor's best interests depends in part
on the nature of the intermediary, its financial incentives, and its
legal obligations to the customer.
There are two distinct channels of investment advice. First,
pooled intermediaries rely on investment advice in the form of
professional asset management to make portfolio selections.71
Second, securities brokers and certain intermediaries may
separately offer individual investment advice to retail savers.
This individual investment advice may not be coupled with
professional asset management, depending on the type of
intermediary and the choices that it offers. For instance, defined
benefit plans, fixed annuity providers, and banks offer professional
asset management. However, they do not offer investment advice
about their portfolio choices to their customers because their
customers are investing in a single pool by definition and therefore
are not confronted with a choice.
Unlike defined benefit plans, fixed annuity issuers, and banks,
other financial intermediaries offer savers a choice of investments,
which can create an opportunity or a need for investment advice.
None of those providers is required to provide investment advice
directly to their retail customers. But if they do provide investment
advice, they have duties to their customers that vary depending on
the legal regime and the type of intermediary.
Full-service securities brokers,72 who recommend mutual funds
and securities issued by individual issuers, operate under weaker
71. See Bernard Delbecque, Key Functions of Asset Management, Vox (Mar.
3, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/key-functions-asset-management ("Asset
management companies offer their intermediary function not only to
households, business firms and governments, but also to the other categories of
financial intermediaries, in particular pension funds and insurance
companies.").




legal duties to their customers than investment advisers. Under
current law, a broker's principal legal obligation is to assure that a
recommended investment is suitable for the customer given the
customer's needs and wants.73 Because the duty of suitability is not
a fiduciary duty, securities brokers are not required to act in their
clients' best interests or diversify their portfolios, so long as
individual recommendations are suitable. Nor must brokers avoid
recommending investments that will maximize their fees if their
advice is suitable otherwise. 74 In contrast, registered investment
advisers 75 owe a heightened fiduciary duty to investors to act in
their best interests under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940.76
IRAs, ordinary mutual funds, and variable annuities that are
sold outside of employer-based retirement plans leave it to
participants and investors to choose the appropriate funds. While
investors in these vehicles are always free to hire brokers or
registered investment advisers to assist them in that choice, nothing
requires them to do so. To the extent they do receive investment
advice, often it is from brokers who bombard them with advice to
buy high-cost products in order to increase the brokers' sales
commissions.77
73. See Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
74. See, e.g., COUNSEL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED
INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 6 (Feb. 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ceacoi-report-final.pdf.
One recent field experiment found that securities brokers marketing mutual
funds tended to advise clients to move their money out of efficient, low-fee funds
into less efficient funds that paid the brokers higher commissions. See Sendhil
Mullainathan, Markus Noeth & Antoinette Schoar, The Market for Financial
Advice: An Audit Study (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
17929, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7929; see also MICHAEL S. FINKE &
BENJAMIN F. CUMMINGS, MODELS OF FINANCIAL ADVICE FOR RETIREMENT PLANS:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLAN SPONSORS 10-11 (2014), https://www.soa.org/Files
/Research/Projects/research-2014-models-finance-advice-retire-report.pdf
(summarizing similar studies).
75. Technically, these professionals are known as investment adviser
representatives and work for registered investment advisers.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012); see Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc.
(TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
77. Recently, the Department of Labor proposed rules to impose stricter
fiduciary duties on sales representatives who provide investment advice with
respect to these products for the purposes of IRAs and employee benefit plans.
Definition of the Term "Fiduciary"; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement
Investment Advice, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,928 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. 2510). For a description of the large number and variety of
financial professionals providing various sorts of financial advice, see John A.
Turner & Dana Muir, The Market for Financial Advisers, in THE MARKET FOR
RETIREMENT FINANCIAL ADVICE (Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smetters eds., 2013).
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The provision of financial education and investment advice to
participants in workplace defined contribution plans is not much
more robust. The rules implementing ERISA require plans to
furnish sufficient information to participants to enable them to
make informed decisions with respect to each investment option.78
In 2006, moreover, Congress added a safe harbor to ERISA that
allows plans to provide investment advice to their participants
without fear of liability, subject to certain safeguards. 79 It is not
clear how much investment advice these plans actually offer,80 and
employers have reason to avoid it because, notwithstanding the safe
harbor, the selection of an investment adviser itself remains a
fiduciary act that subjects the employer to potential liability under
ERISA.s1
Defined contribution plans present a related issue having to do
with the universe of investments from which participants may
choose. In the defined contribution space, the breadth of the
investment menu depends strongly on the vehicle. While IRAs have
loose limitations on eligible investments, the universe of eligible
investments for IRAs is bafflingly vast.82 In contrast, 401(k)s and
other defined contribution plans offered through the workplace are
supposed to provide employees with a modicum of expertise by
curating a palette of investments (normally consisting of mutual
funds and/or fixed or variable annuities). Ninety-five percent of
defined contribution plans are "participant-directed," meaning that
participants make a choice of investments from a palette selected by
78. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-l(b)(2)(i)(B) (2010).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(14), (g); see 26 U.S.C. § 4975(d)(17), (f)(8); see also
Dep't of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Participant Investment
Education, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1996) (describing the circumstances in which
the provision of investment-related information to participants and
beneficiaries in participant-directed individual account pension plans
constitutes investment education instead of investment advice).
80. The Employee Benefit Research Institute reported in 2014 that only
nineteen percent of employees and twenty-five percent of retirees had received
professional investment advice. 2014 Retirement Confidence Survey, EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST. (2014), http://www.ebri.org/surveys/res/2014/. In all
likelihood, at least some of that advice was rendered outside of defined benefit
plans.
81. See Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and
Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2002).
82. According to the Internal Revenue Service, "there is no list of approved
investments for" IRAs. Retirement Plan Investments FAQs, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plan-Investments-FAQs (last




the plan sponsor.83 In curating that menu, these plans operate
under a loose set of federal requirements regarding the investment
options that the plans must offer. Each plan must include at least
three diversified investments with materially different risk and
return characteristics. 84  In addition, the menu must allow
participants to choose different combinations of investments that
allow them to vary the aggregate risk and return profile of their
investments. 85
If the selection of funds is thoughtful, curation provides
beneficiaries of employer defined contribution plans with even more
expertise on top of diversification and the judgment that goes into
selecting the portfolio investments for the underlying individual
funds. Ideally, defined contribution plans can offer up to three types
of expertise that IRAs and ordinary mutual funds do not
automatically provide: curation, certain added types of investment
information, and sometimes even investment advice. When plan
sponsors and investment advisers take their curating
responsibilities seriously and pair it with sound investment advice,
they can use their expertise to craft a well-thought-out selection of
investment options for employees.
The real-world experience with this potential added expertise
has been far from satisfying, however. The investment menu
process for participant-directed defined contribution plans is far
from perfect and has been subject to harsh criticism for years. Too
many menus are littered with employer stock, high-cost low-
performing funds,8 6 or an excessive number of choices. 87 While
there has been modest improvement over time, with defined
contribution plans increasingly migrating toward index fund options
83. See PETER J. WIEDENBECK, 1-4 ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW § 4.05 (2013). Plans offering participant-directed investments are
known as ERISA section 404(c) plans. See id.
84. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3) (2009).
85. Id. There are also weak restrictions on including employee stock as an
investment option. Id. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4).
86. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The
Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and "Dominated Funds" in 401(k) Plans,
124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1476 (2015). Further, in a practice known as revenue
sharing, some investment advisers provide administrative services for free to
employers in exchange for including high-cost funds in pension plans. See id. at
1486.
87. Individual investors can experience decision-making paralysis and
make inappropriate investment decisions when faced with too many investment
options. See Mercer Bullard, The Social Costs of Choice, Free Market Ideology
and the Empirical Consequences of the 401(h) Plan Large Menu Defense, 20
CONN. INS. L.J. 335 (2014); David Goldreich & Hanna Halaburd, When Smaller
Menus Are Better: Variability in Menu-Setting Ability 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch.,




with their lower costs and higher average returns,88 too many funds
continue to offer inappropriate choices.
One of the major problems with investments in individual
securities and defined contribution plans is that investors already
bear the market risk and then too often compound that risk through
common investment errors.89 This is another way that fixed annuity
providers, banks, and defined benefit plans at the left end of the
spectrum provide savers with added protection. Because savers in
all three vehicles invest in a single pool, they are relieved of having
to make investment choices themselves. Instead, all three providers
make their own portfolio selections while assuming the risk of poor
investment choices.90 This gives savers in these vehicles implicit
contractual protection from the risk of improvident portfolio
decisions (plus added protection from loss due to social insurance).
In sum, the level of investment expertise that financial
intermediaries offer to savers generally increases as one moves from
right to left along the intermediation spectrum. Intermediaries at
the left end of the spectrum provide participants with the valuable
added benefit of assuming the downside risk of their portfolio
choices if those choices turn out to be poor.
C. Choice
Another important factor that shapes the tradeoffs between
different degrees of intermediation is the issue of choice. Currently,
only rare individuals can avail themselves of the full range of
retirement savings vehicles. In large part that is because employers
have been progressively replacing defined benefit plans with defined
contribution plans for decades.91  On top of this, millions of
individuals cannot participate in workplace pensions at all, either
because they are not employed or their employers do not offer them
88. See The BrightScope/ICI Defined Contribution Plan Profile: A Close
Look at 401(k) Plans, INV. COMPANY INST. 27 exh.1.11 (Dec. 2014),
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_14_dcplan-profile_401k.pdf.
89. See, e.g., SHLOMo BENARTZI, SAVE MORE TOMORROW: PRACTICAL
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE 401(K) PLANS (2012).
90. Successful asset management is not a given, however, and is
particularly problematic in the case of defined benefit plans because ensuring
optimal investment returns is outside of most employers' core competency. See
Maher, supra note 27.
91. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT (2008); Barbara A.
Butrica et al., supra note 23. In 1975, 62% of active private-sector workers
participated in a defined benefit plan (where the defined benefit plan was the
only plan); in 2009, that percentage was 7%. Meanwhile, the percentage of
active private-sector workers who participated in a defined contribution plan
(where the defined contribution plan was the only plan) jumped from 16% in
1975 to 67% in 2009. EMP. BENEFIT RET. INST., supra note 52, ch. 1, at 4.
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any type of pension plan. 9 2 The number of affected workers is
substantial: employers of half of all U.S. employees offer no pension
plan to their rank-and-file workers.9 3
Outside of the workplace, most individuals can participate in
IRAs but only to the extent they have earned income. 94 Even then,
the annual contribution limits for standard IRAs are substantially
lower than those for tax-sheltered employer-based pension plans.95
The other main retirement savings options for individuals outside of
the workplace are fixed annuities, bank deposits,96 ordinary mutual
funds, and direct investments in individual issuers or other assets
(purchased through a broker or not).
What do retirement savers lose when they lack full choice
among retirement savings vehicles? The vast majority of
individuals who are shut out of defined benefit plans must bear
longevity risk unless they buy a traditional fixed annuity,9 7 which
many are reluctant to do. Those same individuals are also exposed
to two other risks: market risk and inflation risk.
Many individuals who lack access to defined benefit plans also
lack access to defined contribution plans with mandatory
contributions and matches, which are designed to produce adequate
92. In the private sector, employers have no legal obligation to sponsor a
pension plan unless they agree to do so in collective bargaining or employment
contracts.
93. In 2009, for instance, 50.7% of workers were employed by employers
who did not sponsor a retirement plan. EMP. BENEFIT RET. INST., supra note 52,
at ch. 10, tbl. 10. 10b.
94. See, e.g., Carrie Schwab-Pomerantz, Can You Contribute to an IRA If
You Don't Have a Job?, CHARLEs SCHWAB (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://www.schwab.com'public/schwab/resource-center/expert-insight/askcarri
e/retirement/can-you-contribute_to_anira_if you-dont-have-ajob.html.
95. For 2015, the contribution limit for IRAs was $5500 (with an added
$1000 catch-up contribution for individuals age fifty or over), whereas the
maximum contribution limit for workplace defined contribution plans that year
(except for SIMPLE plans) was $18,000 plus a $6000 catch-up contribution for
older workers. COLA Increases for Dollar Limitations on Benefits and
Contributions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/COLA-Increases-for-
Dollar-Limitations-on-Benefits-and-Contributions (last updated May 12, 2015).
Defined benefit plans are subject to a different type of contribution limit. For
2015, plan contributions could not exceed what was needed to provide an
annual benefit of 100% of a participant's average compensation for his or her
highest three consecutive calendar years or $210,000, whichever was less.
Retirement Topics-Defined Benefit Plan Benefit Limits, IRS, http://www.irs.gov
/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Topics-Defined-
Benefit-Plan-Benefit-Limits (last updated Dec. 19, 2014). As the IRS noted,
"[a]ctuarial assumptions and computations are required to figure these
contributions." Id.
96. Bank deposits are normally not ideal for long-term investment due to
the inflation risk presented by their low rate of return.
97. Social Security benefits partially offset this longevity risk but their
replacement rate is relatively low.
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replacement rates. These people bear cumulation risk on top of
longevity risk, market risk, and inflation risk. This cumulation risk
is even greater for savers who have no access to workplace pension
plans at all. Not surprisingly, these two groups of households are at
the greatest risk of falling short of savings at retirement.
The degree of choice among retirement savings options also
affects individuals' degree of access to investment expertise.
Practically every saver has access to the expertise offered by full-
service securities brokers and mutual funds (with or without IRA
wraps). But if savers also want providers to curate a menu of
mutual funds and annuities, they must have access to an employer-
based defined contribution plan. And if they further want
intermediaries to take responsibility for choosing the investments
while safeguarding against market risk, savers must either go to
depository institutions or fixed annuity providers or count
themselves among the lucky few with access to a defined
contribution plan.
As this situation suggests, the intermediation spectrum in the
retirement context has serious discontinuities in supply.
Individuals have extremely broad access to brokered securities,9 8
commodities, mutual funds, fixed and variable annuities, IRAs, and
bank accounts. They have much less access to defined benefit and
defined contribution plans at work. Consequently, the savings
vehicles that offer individuals the greatest protection from risk are
in the least supply.
This lack of choice is restricted to the left of the intermediation
spectrum and turns on whether a particular savings vehicle is
employer or market based. Employers have fled from defined
benefit plans in recent years to avoid the volatility, high potential
costs, and fiduciary responsibilities that are inherent in the market,
inflation, and longevity risk that those plans assume.9 9 Defined
contribution plans do not pose the same risks to employers, but their
high administrative costs and associated fiduciary duties cause
many employers to shun those plans as well.
In contrast, fixed annuity providers and depository institutions
consciously embrace market risk (and longevity risk, in the case of
98. With the exception of public offerings.
99. By law, defined benefit plan sponsors can freeze a plan at any time by
converting a defined benefit annuity to a lump sum plan. In addition, they can
often transfer their plan liabilities to a third party. See Brendan S. Maher &
Paul Secunda, Pension De-Risking, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2577159. Meanwhile, in
2014, the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act allowed plan sponsors of private-
sector multiemployer defined benefit plans in "critical and declining status" to
suspend benefits for both active and retired participants. See Multiemployer
Pension Reform Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2132.
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annuity providers) as intrinsic to their business models. Compared
to run-of-the-mill employers, these insurance companies and banks
specialize in investment expertise and have market incentives to
deploy that expertise successfully to earn profits. Like employer-
based pension plans, both of these intermediaries fall on the left end
of the intermediation spectrum, but neither of them is saddled with
the limitations on supply that workplace pension plans entail.
In an ideal world, we could harness the positive market
incentives of both types of intermediaries to provide retirement
savings options with greater safeguards to investors than current
alternatives offer. Bank deposits, however, are normally not
appropriate investments for the long-time horizon needed for
retirement savings due to their low rates of return. Fixed annuities,
in contrast, have distinct merits as retirement savings vehicles
because they offer tax advantages and sophisticated investment
expertise to savers, plus protection from market risk, longevity risk,
and even inflation risk (at a price).
The challenge then is to design a system in which fixed
annuities become a credible substitute for defined benefit plans.
Here, the stress is on the word credible. Fixed annuities have the
opposite problem of their defined benefit counterparts in that they
suffer from a shortfall in demand, not supply. Many savers are
reluctant to buy fixed annuities due to their high cost,100 their low
rates of return in today's low interest environment, bequest motives,
and the fear that people will not obtain a full financial payout if they
prematurely die. Moreover, a substantial minority of states do not
hold insurance agents to a strict fiduciary duty or even a duty of
suitability when selling fixed annuities. 101 The challenge, then, is to
design a system that credibly addresses these concerns while
incorporating a mandatory savings feature in order to defray
cumulation risk. If this can be accomplished, then individuals could
have access to the same full range of protections at the left end of
the intermediation spectrum without the supply limitations posed
by defined benefit plans.
CONCLUSION
In the retirement savings arena, there are a wide variety of
financial intermediaries and investment options, some which are
100. See, e.g., Daniel Bauer & Frederik Weber, Assessing Investment and
Longevity Risks Within Immediate Annuities 2-3 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.aria.org/meetings/2007papers/IE%20-%203%20-
%20Weber.pdf (reviewing literature); Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba,
Selection Effects In The United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market, 112
ECON. J. 28 (2002).
101. See FINKE & CUMMINGS, supra note 74, at 12.
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freely available to investors and some which are not. The risk
tradeoffs of these different options and the amount of investment
expertise they provide to investors vary greatly among types of
intermediaries and are a function of the types of claims that those
intermediaries provide. The type of intermediary offering the
greatest protection-defined benefit plans-is also in short supply.
This article explains how fixed annuities, which are not subject to
the same constrictions in supply, could provide many of the same
protections as the vanishing defined benefit plan if other serious
reservations about those products were addressed.
